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interview: Paul Taylor 
Pragmatism 
and the Philosophical 
Critique of "R~ce" 
by Owen Dwyer, Arnold Farr 
and Chad Staddon ·November 1995 
aul Taylor was invited to the University of Kentucky to 
give a lecture and seminar on the general topics of race, 
racism and racial(ised) politics in the US. His lecture, 
entitled "The New Negro" discussed philosophical is-
sues related to the politics of identity and argued for 
the retention of race as a political category. 
Paul Taylor was invited to the University of Ken-
tucky to give a lecture and seminar on the general top-
ics of race, racism and racial(ised) politics in the U.S. 
His lecture, entitled "The New Negro" discussed 
philosophical issues related to the politics of identity 
and argued for the retention of race as a political cat-
egory. Taylor is currently an assistant professor of phi-
losophy at the University of Kentucky, and a member 
of the Affrilachian Poets, a Lexington-based writer's 
collective. He did his undergraduate work at 
Morehouse College and his graduate work at Rutgers 
University (under the tutelage of Peter Kivy, Howard 
McGary, and Corne! West). At present he is working 
on a critique of various philosophical accounts of race, 
preparing to publish chapters from his dissertation 
(which explores the implications of John Dewey's aes-
thetic theory for philosophical aesthetics and cultural 
studies), and assembling a collection of poetry and 
short fiction with the other Affrilachians. 
In this interview we sought to explore Taylor's 
pragmatist perspective on the constitutive relations be-
tween experience and social identity, the "New Negro" 
and the contemporary politics of race, including the 
recently conducted "Million Man March" in Washing-
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professed pragmatist perspective on the constitutive relations between 
experience and social identity, the "New Negro" and the contempo-
rary politics of race, including the recently conducted "Million Man 
March" in Washington, DC. 
dC: A White lady asked once this question of me; how does she prove 
that she and I are of different races? And then she came up with an 
example to complicate matters more; what if she was an Arab or some 
other dark-skinned person (other than an African-American) living in 
Forsyth County, Georgia? What if she was treated the same way that I 
would be treated as an African-American? In a way she is not Black, 
she's just not of the same race that I am, using "race" in its original 
sense. But in a way she is Black because she is treated as a Black 
American in Forsyth County. Is the historical account of race enough 
to make a distinction there or is more needed? How would you ad-
dress that kind of problem? 
PT: The historical account isn't enough and I don't take it that my ac-
count is purely historical. History lays the groundwork for other ele-
ments that I employ. At one time I was very concerned with questions 
like that. Another incarnation of the discussion that I gave yesterday 
was centered on the project of providing the resources to identify 
people racially. In it I stressed two points; jointly necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. The former was the idea that you're Black if you 
would be identified as a Black person. The latter condition was that 
you had to have a certain kind of biography, a history of certain kinds 
of experiences. With those two conditions in place, we have a better 
idea of what to say about someone like a Palestinian in Forsyth 
County who is treated a certain kind of way. This person might not 
have the right kind of history because of the very narrow logic of 
hypo-descent that is in place in the US South. Even though she is 
treated in a certain way, she doesn't satisfy the other sufficient condi-
tion, so therefore she is not Black exactly. That's the kind of thing I 
would have said. In fact, I guess that's in part what I would still say. 
The reason I hesitate is because I am not as concerned with those 
questions anymore. It's not so crucial for me to identify people. I'm 
~t trying to provide the resources for those sores of determinations. 
( 
tplere's another element to worry about though, and any account I 
rg~,e fs going to be really fuzzy around the edges. There are lots of 
.,. I ,, 
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people about whom we don't really know what to say, such as the Pal-
estinian woman in Forsyth County, Georgia. I'm quite content to say 
in those cases that there is a certain sense in which this identitarian 
project is going to have the feel of arbitrariness, but as I said yesterday 
it's not arbitrary, it's contingent. What is arbitrary is precisely where we 
draw the line, but the general feature of the line, that excludes some 
people and includes others, is going to be connected with this contin-
gent history. As a good pragmatist, I'm content to say that you have to 
choose but the choice is not arbitrary. 
dC: I wondered as well about the weight you place on biographical 
experience. Inasmuch as we can think about situations where crossed 
identities are being constituted, the relations between identity and ex-
perience become more complex. I can think of at least two examples 
drawn from filmic representations. One example involves Mina Nair's 
film Mississippi Masala ( 1991), where an important component of the 
story revolves around the question of who is "Black,,, and subse-
quently, what do such determinations mean? The same theme is 
treated in Spike Lee's Do the Right Thing (1989) as well. Recall the 
scene where the Black protagonists are rioting because of the murder 
of one of their comrades, Radio Raheem, by police. Approached by 
the rioters, the Korean store owner brandishes a broom to protect his 
shop against them saying, "Don't hit me. I'm one of you. Tm Black 
also." Similarly, in Mississippi Masala blurred racial identities are im-
plied by the direct experiences of racial oppression undergone by the 
Indian protagonists in Idi Amin's Uganda and, later, in the US South. 
These filmic explorations make me wonder about this thing called 
"experience?" Certainly you can have an externally-described experi-
ence, a more or less "official" history of Black America (perhaps as 
represented in the writings of Frederick Douglass, James Baldwin and 
Eldridge Cleaver), but that may not map onto the experience to 
which you yourself, or your peer circle, relate. I was left thinking that 
this foundation of biographical experience that we are talking about 
is, perhaps, somewhat more fuzzy and harder to pin down. Maybe 
that's why you are less concerned about it in your current work? 
PT: Not exactly. I think I have more interesting things to say about 
experience now than in the past because I now work with John 
Dewey's philosophy of experience. I have more philosophical re-
sources to deal adequately with the idea of experience. But I see the 
problem that you are trying to get at, and it's the kind of problem you 
get from a lot of Harlem Renaissance-era novels. Consider Nela 
Larsen's Passing (1929), in which you have people who we might 
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think of as Black, except that they have very light skin, and they pass 
themselves off as White people. But they are very serious about it and 
they go all the way and they never come back to the Black commu-
nity; they just go on with their lives as White people and nobody 
knows the difference. In such cases, the question becomes, what do 
you say about such a person? She genuinely doesn't see herself as 
Black, and no one else sees her that way either, because of this acci-
dent of physiology that she happens to get away with passing as 
White. I take it that that's the kind of thing you're worried about? 
What I've said about those people is that there is a certain kind of psy-
chological dynamic you have to go through to get yourself in that po-
sition. You have to tell yourself certain kinds of stories about yoursel£ 
You have to, at some point, internally describe yourself in such a man-
ner that legitimates your position as someone who engages in these 
sort of behaviors. At some point that person identifies herself as pass-
ing--or other people do-and that's the crucial thing for me because 
that's also a Black experience. That's one of the kind of racialized expe-
riences that I had in mind. 
dC: How are we to know what is the 'real' history? Whose history do 
we listen to? What counts as experience? What counts as history? 
Mostly importantly, who decides? 
PT: I had a feeling I didn't answer the question. The original question 
was difficult, involving the recognition that history is the outcome of 
certain kinds of interpretive processes. Once you recognize that, then 
the question becomes, "how can history be a stable ground upon 
which to build a philosophical or political project?" 
dC: Is that indeed part of your project, to define a racial identity par-
tially due to historical experience? 
PT: The more I hear this question the more interesting it gets. While 
history is the outcome of interpretive processes, and this is cause for 
concern for some people, it's cause for concern only if you believe that 
there is something beyond interpretation, that there is a "true" history 
to be told. There isn't and it's silly to be hoping for it. Some people 
think there should be some sort of history that I can unfailingly grab 
onto like this glass (PT picks up a water glass from the table, eds.). 
But there isn't. There are only interpretations that generate things that 
sort of look like "glass." That might seem to be a problem but it's not 
-- because experience, like history, is interpretive. Experience then be-
/ roiiies a series of narratives that you tell yourself about things that 
~ ~appen~d .to you. ~he consequence of this is that all experience ralif ~1story is Interpretive, though one must quickly add that this 
~ 
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doesn't open the door to boundless relativism. I can't offer just any in-
terpretation of history. It's going to be constrained by things. I can't 
give it any old meaning because this interpretive process happens in a 
community which will not accept certain interpretations. And once 
you appreciate that history is an interpretive process that takes place 
in a community, then you don't worry so much about the fact that it's 
an interpretive process because it's bounded as a community project. 
dC: Is there a way of forming a racial community by not just talking 
about history but by talking about a non-history. I read some Walter 
Benjamin last year and also Toni Morrison's Playing in the Dark 
(1992), and what stood out for me in those books was the idea of 
White identities being constituted by a "hidden identity," a 
non-history of African-Americans. White identities relying upon a 
strategic effacement of Black identities. An Africanist presence inside, 
hidden within the White identity. What Toni Morrison did was go 
back to several novels, written by White people about White people, 
and construct-from them-a Black history. 
dC: There could be at least two moments to this process. The first is a 
Foucauldian moment which goes after the substantive aspects of that 
history and looks for those moments, those critical junctures, when 
images of Whiteness and Blackness are constructed in particular ways 
or (more to your point), certain connections and elisions are estab-
lished as normal. For instance, the colonialist association between 
"Whiteness,, and "progress" perhaps. Thinking about it geographi-
cally, the settling of the American West as a White project, a project of 
White occupation which at the same time was an elision or putting 
aside of all other possibilities, Native American possibilities, Hispanic 
possibilities, Black possibilities, etc. 
PT: That makes sense. That's part of what I have in mind. I'm sur-
prised that my reference to history has merited so much attention. I 
don't mean the sort of things that Asante would mean. Asante would 
mean that there is a history of Black people just like there is a history 
of Molefi Asante and it belongs to all of us-just as my biography be-
longs to me. I don't mean to imply such a fundamentalist account. I 
mean something a lot more flexible and broad than that. Part of what 
I mean is the sort of interpretive history we are talking about through 
which we can tell a story in various ways at various points in history. 
The history of philosophy, for example, can be told in certain ways. It 
may be said that it begins with Thales without even mentioning the 
contributions of the Egyptians. At this historical moment it became 
useful to tell certain stories about the history of Egypt. In the Enlight-
cu 
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enment, for example, it became important to link ourselves to this 
classical heritage and it was a bad idea to link that classical heritage to 
anything else (such as earlier Egyptian or Arabic philosophising). 
Consequently it becomes important to remove or obscure the connec-
tions between classical cultures and other cultures in the ancient 
world. Part of the account that I want to construct is the account of 
being the kind of people who keep having this done to you. 
dC: You seem to be pointing to a concern with the discursive modali-
ties of the historical-geographical imagination. This speaks to a sec-
ond Derridean, moment, to that critical historiography which would 
go after modes of Western modernity, modes of constructing history 
as such, as themselves fully redolent of a certain normativity of class, 
race, and gender dominations. I'm thinking particularly of Hayden 
White (1987), who talks about different ways, or tropes, of writing 
history: "chronicles" versus "annals". He suggests that the medieval 
choice in favor of chronicles is politically and socially loaded. The 
idea is that after this crucial juncture, historical moments are sud-
denly clipped together with an overriding discursive linearity. That's a 
brief summary of course, but it seems that this other level of critique 
is possible, which involves not so much looking for the lost voices or 
their agonistic expression (as a Foucauldian approach might do), but 
rather going after the intellectual-cultural edifice itself. 
PT: The kind of work that I am familiar with tries to do similar things 
from a different kind of angle. William James and John Dewey both 
engage imagined critics who assume that pragmatism undermines the 
possibility of historical knowledge. William James constructs an 
imagined dialogue between himself and a critic who he calls the 
"anti-pragmatist." The anti-pragmatist asks James to explain how, if 
James is correct, do we ever know that Caesar was killed? James replies 
by saying that you need to deflate your conception of knowledge. You 
can't get the kind of fundamentalist knowledge that you want from 
any kind of inquiry, much less an historical inquiry. My account sim-
ply makes historical inquiry continuous with these other sorts of in-
quiry, such that the propositions or judgments that we would make 
about a historical fact are going to be contingent. 
~-
~· Is there a political imperative to creating the "New Negro"? It 
-~)· ~ that much of your interest in developing the concept of the 
• , iS J 
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"New Negro" stems from recent talk on both the right and the left 
about abolishing the concept of race altogether. On the right, this 
abolition stands in favour of some insidiously naive "colour blind-
ness," and the left it marks an attack on the ontological status of race 
-possibly just as naive bur perhaps not as insidious! 
PT. Thar's the primary reason why I bothered. It seems to me that 
there is at least this: the access to existing institutional power. Even if 
we accept the claim that we have to stop talking about. The simple 
fact is that people organize themselves in these ways already. Trying to 
tell people that they should not be identifying themselves in this way 
simply because it relies on bad biological or absolutist notions is a bit 
akin to swimming upstream. Ir seems a strange project to engage in. 
dC: Yet race seems at times to be a constraining rather than an en-
abling concept, or at least the concept has been thusly attacked by 
bonafide anti-racist forces recently-setting aside Democrats and Re-
publicans like Pete :Vilson w~o have held, up a sor~ ~f naiv: 'co~or 
blindness' as somethmg to stnve for. Whats the poliacal project in-
volved in constructing this new progressive concept of race? 
PT: Well, the way I conceive of race, it isn't a narrow category at all. It 
has a great deal of internal complexity which is to say that it allows for 
the existence of all sorts of sub-groupings-classes, ethnicities, gen-
ders; you get all of that inside this category and I don't m~ ~o fla:ten 
any of that. The point is nor to flatten difference. The pomt is to sim-
ply identify and recognize the fact that there are certain politic~ and 
social facts which suggest that it is productive and reasonable to iden-
tify ourselves above-and-beyond all these other identities as ~art of 
the same group, as part of a racial group. Moreover, the pro1ect of 
constructing a racial community in this way is continuous with cer-
tain kinds of historical patterns that we have already discussed. 
·-> 
Pete Wilson's bid for the Republican presidential nomination is inter-
esting because it highlights a number of the complexities ~nvolv~~ in 
race. For example, it highlights the local nature of racial pohacs. 
Wilson's arguments about federal Affirmative Action prog~~mes-. 
11 insofar as I understand them-carried him as fur as they did m Cali- .~ 
fornia because there is a certain kind of dynamic going on there, i.e., 1: 
there are Asian immigrants who are doing well and still receive hen- ~ 
efits from Affirmative Action and people are very unhappy about that. g' 
In the eyes of many people in California, Affirmative Action didn't ·c 
have anything to do with Black people. That's one readi~g of it. Inte~- .~ 
estingly, when he tried to take his message to the entire country lt 
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didn't go as far. 
Another thing that it highlights is the shift from what Paul Gilroy re-
fers to as "hierarchical racism,, to "crisis racism." The idea is that even 
when we stop talking about race and we stop talking about inferiority, 
we still get the same patterns of exclusion, or ones that are very simi-
lar, but they are (re)coded in new ways, e.g., it's not so much that the 
woman from Nigeria is inferior it's just that I don't want her here with 
me, she's different. The resonance that the Affirmative Action debates 
have in this country possesses an element of this sort of crisis racism. 
I did also want to touch on the ideal of a color-blind society. One of 
the reasons that I was so excited about engaging in the project of 
reconceptualising racial politics is that I think it's important to com-
plicate the philosophical appeal of color blindness, of the Kantian 
noumenal self that underlies all determination, which attempts to ef-
face issues of race. That kind of idea is at the core of liberal political 
theory and is very much in evidence in the work of Michael Sandel. 
He says, for example, that Rawlsian liberalism presupposes a self that 
can distinguish itself from all of these determining features. For me 
the important point here is that the ideal presupposes a moment of 
self-identification that is unattainable and philosophically sort of silly. 
The punch line is inevitably that difference is ineradicable as a matter 
of historical fact. We have this trope of difference which undergirds all 
of our experiences and lives. I think we should recognize this and deal 
with it. For some of us there is not much of an alternative. For me, for 
example, I do not have an ethnic alternative. I can't be an Ibo or a 
Hausa or Fulani or Maasai. I can't do that. I'm a Black American. If 
you want to call that an ethnicity that's fine, but to call it that and 
leave it at that obscures the fact that there are certain sorts of things 
and sorts of interactions that I can enter into when I go other places 
in the world that do not have anything to do with ethnicity. I can go 
to Haiti and have people embrace me in a certain way that wouldn't 
happen if I weren't a Black American. My sister can go to Ghana and 
have people say "welcome home," which simply wouldn't happen to 
her if race was just some narrow local phenomena. So it's a local phe-
nomenon that has a global aspect to it. That's one of the things that 
happens when you have human difference upon which communities 
identify themselves within the boundaries of those differences. That's 
a good thing, I think. For this reasons I say that color blindness is silly. 
r'We don't need color blindness. People have to identify themselves 
/~th things and they will. It's nice to talk about cosmopolitan person-
f ;:;diti~ and nomad subjectivities, but that's kind of empty talk to me, 
~1'1.,,J.~,J 
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you need something, and this is one of the somethings we can use. 
dC: There's a certain sense too in which the ideology of color blind-
ness is in fact a kind of conservative normalcy. Yet another attempt to 
deny the difference that difference makes. The political, social, and 
everyday significance of human difference is often subverted as the 
very foundation of an attempt to get back to the idea of the disem-
bodied noumenal self. In that sense it's profoundly conservative. 
PT: You're right and I talked about it a moment ago with reference to 
philosophical underpinnings, but I'm glad you raised the political 
point-it's probably the more interesting stuff. The talk about color 
blindness only takes on a certain resonance at a certain moment in 
history when you can, for example, take the language from the civil 
rights movement to reject the gains achieved through the use of these 
very rhetorics. So color blindness takes on a certain resonance at an 
historical moment because it serves conservative political purposes. It 
doesn't interrogate the fact that we weren't color blind for a very long 
time. They say, for example, that the US Constitution is a color-blind 
document. Well, no, there's this little thing about "three-fifths of a 
person.,, It's profoundly conservative. It's deeply insincere. Perhaps I 
gave too much credit to the philosophical underpinnings because 
there's this political stuff which is just ridiculous. 
dC: It's an attempt to overlook a history that has already set in motion 
its own consequences; it's caused quite a bit of damage, and I would 
argue that it's caused psychological damage to an entire race-I'm 
talking about Black-self hatred. It's an attempt to wipe out this history 
and then say "pull yourself up by your boot straps.,, But we didn't 
have any boots on! In fact, we'd have done it bur the boots-so to 
speak-were taken away. It's racism, a racism that changes forms to 
adapt to what the Civil Rights Movement has accomplished. And this 
racism is harder to recognize. You don't have to worry about walking 
and somebody calling you "nigger"-that's not the main problem 
anymore. 
PT: Racism is gone! 
dC: Not quite. 
PT: No more racism! 
dC: In your articles "Context and Color-Confrontation: Cress 
Theory and the Necessity of Racism" and "So Black and Blue: Re-
cu 
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sponse to Rudinow" I get the sense that you are emphasizing the con-
text in which certain subjective statements about the "reality of the 
world" were made. Why is it so important to do that? 
PT: As a good Deweyian I focus on context. Furthermore, what I do 
with statements is treat them as "natural growths" and examine their 
conditions of emergence and continuation. If it worries you that 
people say things like 'White people can,t play the blues,, then figure 
out why they say it, what conditions give rise to it, perpetuate it, etc. 
Then figure out what to do with the conditions, how to alter them; 
that is politics. 
dC: What do we get politically when we try to understand the context 
from which a statement emerges? 
PT: You get a more nuanced and productive local discourse, perhaps. 
You don't get "Donahue discourse." You don,t get people jumping up 
and shouting what they feel and not caring what others have to say 
about it. You get something like empathy; something like what 
Cornell West means when he says we have to understand each others' 
pain in order to keep from causing each other more pain. 
dC: It seems that when you emphasize context and understanding it 
creates the possibility for differentiating between an opinion and the 
person who expresses it. For example, let's say you find a statement to 
be offensive. If you conflate the person with the statement you 
essentialize him or her. If on the other hand you seek to know the 
context in which that statement was made, you don1t necessarily ex-
cuse what they say but nor do you demonize them individually. 
PT: And on the other side of the equation, not only do you demonize 
the person, you subjectify the opinion, and you fail to appreciate the 
extent to which that opinion is dependent upon certain kinds of 
structures of discourse which exist beyond the individual. It's an opin-
ion that people share and offer and use as a tool of rhetoric in a sys-
tematic fashion, and you just treat as something that came out of this 
guy's face. If it's worrisome or offensive to you, you should take it 
more seriously. 
That's the kind of thing we're peculiarly unsuited to deal well with in 
American politics because people are just individuals, right? People 
are not embedded in any structure. They're just there and they say 
what they say. Of course it's not that simple. People are socialized into 
!=C,I;tain ways of thinking and speaking and they can reconstruct those 
1' .:ys of thinking and speaking in ways that express their individuality, 
~U't 'that doesn't mean that they are completely independent of those 
w 
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structures. They are the "agents of novelty," Dewey says. They can 
revolutionize those discourses but they are not separate from them. 
dC: Regarding your response to Rudinow, how go you guard against 
the charge that you are, in effect, excusing the use of essentialist cat-
egories? How do you deal with that sort of reading of your argument 
about Blues authenticity? 
PT: You make the distinction between excuses and explanation. Then 
you say that I'm worried by this the same way you are; I say in the 
piece that I think the "Black Blues Authenticity" (BBA) thesis is false, 
but we ought to figure out why some people adhere to it. So, it's not 
so much that I want to excuse it. I think they have reasons for saying 
it and these reasons are important and interesting and we ought to in-
terrogate them. The reasons have to do with things like the systematic 
expropriation of what we might think of as Black forms of expressive 
culture, and the deployment of those forms, as they are appropriated 
to the monetary gain of certain people and detriment of others, and 
this happens in a systematic fashion over and over again. This is one 
of the things that I think motivates the BBA claim. That's a compli-
cated process that we should understand. 
dC: Let me give you another reading of your Rudinow response that 
perhaps will push you to clarify your point. Quoting from your paper, 
On this Deweyian approach even a performance that cannot be im-
mediately identified as White may fail to produce the 'authentic' 
blues performance feeling. If the listener does not know the racial 
identity of the performer her experience may be stunted so that the 
proper feeling does not emerge right away and upon discovering later 
that the performer was white she can not recruit the memory into 
present consciousness in a way that generates the proper quality. 
PT: That's horrible. Sorry about that. 
dC: I don't think so. It pushed me to think about the degree to which 
your explanation of a reaction to a musical performance could be sued 
to explain or excuse other "performances.,, Allow me to paraphrase 
from the passage I just read to you, only this time I'll substitute a dif-
ferent sort of performance-that of an accountant filing a client's rax 
return. Supposing that the accountant is Black and the client is 
White, how does this strike you? 
On this Deweyan approach even the performance such as doing my 
taxes cannot be immediately identified as White because it may fail to 
produce the "Authentic Accounting Performance" (AAP) feeling. If I 
do not know the racial identity of the accountant, my experience may 
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be stunted so that the proper feeling does not emerge right away, that 
feeling of my taxes being done correctly because I have certain no-
tions about what it means to be White or Black. Upon discovering 
later that the accountant was indeed Black, I cannot recruit the 
memory into present consciousness in a way that generates the proper 
quality. 
PT: One thing to say is that in the initial case we're dealing with an 
aesthetic experience and for· Dewey these were subject to a special 
analysis. We tend not to think of having one's taxes done as an aes-
thetic experience. So there's that. The upshot of the aesthetic experi-
ence for me is the qualitative enjoyment of it and appreciation of its 
beauty as it unfolds. Presumably that's not the upshot of getting your 
taxes done; rather, you merely avoid paying as much tax as possible. 
dC: True, but I'm trying to get at the person who, because his or her 
accountant was Black, would not feel comfortable, and would wonder 
if there were mistakes just because they are Black. I'm trying to see if 
your argument makes it possible to excuse that racist response. 
PT: I don't think so. In part because it's not an aesthetic experience 
and the only way to get to that conclusion of an aesthetic experience 
is simply to appeal to some preconceptions of the skill or ability of the 
person in question and I try very hard to distance those kinds of read-
ings from the BBA thesis. A component of this unfolding aesthetic 
experience of a White performance frustrates listeners so that it 
doesn't unfold properly. 
dC: How about this: I'm in my Black accountant's office and I see her 
diplomas on the wall. She's dressed professionally. And yet I still don't 
get the feeling of security and trust that I expect to feel when I go to 
the accountant. 
PT: The other thing that I should say, I think that accounting does 
not have the same history as a racialized idiom of performance as the 
blues does, assuming that the blues does. In the same way that cham-
ber music, while it is identified as a European form of music, doesn't 
have a history as a racial project, it wasn't the kind of thing that you 
put out there as evidence of racial superiority, as the paradigm of the 
expressive capacity of a racial group. It can work that way but it 
doesn't have a history of being articulated for that purpose. Even less 
so than accounting chamber music has a better claim to that status 
than does accounting. 
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dC: I would like to consider now a question dealing with the Million 
Man March. One thing that I think we have to address is the exclu-
sion of women from the March, and the potential problems with the 
theme of atonement in the Black community. To some extent, the 
structure of the Black community still hasn't changed, and by that I 
mean, women in the Black church tradition continue to experience 
second-class status. As a result, there the perception that if there's 
something wrong it's the men who will correct it, the men who will 
get together and have a march, devise plans, ere. How are you going 
to address that kind of issue with respect to further emancipation of 
Blacks, taking due account to feminist and other concerns about the 
exclusivity of Black political action. More concretely, what are the 
positive outcomes of the March? 
PT: Well, the drawbacks are the ones you pointed out. In a certain 
sense, Louis Farrakhan convened the March. The Nation of Islam, 
which he heads up, is deeply patriarchal, so ies not surprising that this 
characteristic is repeated in the form of the March. Even worse, as you 
point out, there are respects in which the broader Black community is 
in fact extremely patriarchal and that comes from various sects of the 
Black-church tradition-the history of identifying ourselves as a 
people by reference to certain Biblical narratives and then borrowing 
all of this extraneous baggage along with it. Worse still, there's the fact 
that the Black community is embedded within a larger patriarchal 
American society. You get all these themes which are tunneling 
through all of this. That's indeed a problem. 
But it doesn't have to be a problem across the board. I mean that there 
is some reason to think that Black men face certain problems nor en-
countered by other people, even Black women. To the extent that that 
is so, it may be useful for them to convene together, in the same way 
that it is useful for alcoholics to get together in Alcoholics Anony-
mous and nobody complains that, well, I'm not an alcoholic and I 
want to come in too. It may be useful in the same way for Black men 
to get together. However, that fact has been overlaid with all of these 
patriarchal themes and inflated into a different approach and the ap-
proach becomes, as you say, Black men are faced by certain problems 
and that's even more worrisome because Black men have to save the 
whole community. So we have to save the Black man before they can 
fulfill their role of saving the community. 
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I think if it were possible to separate the Alcoholics Anonymous ap-
proach-that there are certain people who have been disproportion-
ately impacted by certain kinds of forces and that we should get them 
together to talk about it and deal with it-if you could separate that 
idea from all this other garbage, that would help. If you could separate 
the idea that Black men are the standard bearers of the Black commu-
nity and that they are the salvation of the group, it would be almost a 
seamlessly good thing. Then the struggle becomes trying to separate 
that stuff out. You sit Farrakhan down and say that yes, Black men go 
to jail more than others, but thaes a problem in and of itself and you 
don't have to overload it with all of these other things, specifically the 
idea that the fate of race rests on the fate of these people because they 
are special somehow. The struggle, the political struggle, becomes one 
of separating these themes. 
dC: Or as you put it in the paper on Cress-Welsing theory, separating 
the "theodicy" from the "therapy" as two moments that structure. 
PT: How do you see the theodicy coming in? 
dC: That whole sense of immanence, religious-historical immanence 
which some folks wanted to pack into the event as something separate 
from, very simply, a group of men getting together who happen to 
have a shared experience and for whom it would be useful to reflect 
upon that shared experience. 
PT: In some senses, yes, I thought that the Million Man March was 
probably a therapeutic endeavor, but I don't know how much any 
sense of theodicy has a role to play. You could say that the imposition 
of all these extraneous themes is motivated in part by an attempt to 
deal with the theodicy, the idea is that all these horrible things have 
happened to us and we have to be a certain kind of people to deal 
with these questions. Dealing with this has been bound up with the 
tradition of describing ourselves with reference to certain Biblical 
texts, which necessarily brings in an element of theodicy. 
dC: The political problem for the Black community that comes out of 
this interpretation is how far can one convince people like Farrakhan 
to separate those two moments. How far can you expect them to actu-
ally move? 
PT: Well, then the question becomes a question of liberal politics. 
Look, Farrakhan is a minister and that's what he's always going to be; 
/.he,leads a religious group. So, when you're trying to figure out how to 
( 
J,ririg Farrakhan to the table and separate out the theodical elements 
~his story which say things like "White people are the devil," you 
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have to figure out how to cultivate in these people a certain kind of 
internal morality. You need to explore how this morality can overlap 
with moralities from other groups in useful ways, in the public space. 
You have to ask those kinds of questions and deal with that when you 
want to figure out how to get Farrakhan in without some of his more 
contentious ideas. 
dC: The question, therfore, is not how far you can change him, but 
rather who else should be at the table. Make sure that Farrakhan is 
there, and so is Cornell West, so is Jesse Jackson, so are a myriad of 
other people who would create that overlapping sense of morality of 
which you speak. 
PT: I think that's the only way to do it. That's why ies important to 
talk to Farrakhan because if you don't talk to him he's just going to 
become more extreme. Bring him to the table so that he's held ac-
countable to a community of people who are trying to achieve a com-
mon goal. And you have to be sensitive to the fact that he's walking a 
political tightrope himself. The internal politics of the Nation of Is-
lam keep him from being more progressive, than he could be. He's 
made noises about being more progressive but there's a more radical 
element within the Nacion that will blow up if he backs up too 
quickly from certain kinds of core themes and ideas. 
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